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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes a two-stage model for identifying and contextualizing features from
artefacts created as a result of social networking activity. This technique can be useful in
digital investigations and is based on understanding and the deconstruction of the processes
that take place prior to, during and after user activity; this includes corroborating artefacts.
Digital Investigations are becoming more complex due to factors such as, the volume of data
to be examined; different data formats; a wide range of sources for digital evidence; the
volatility of data and the limitations of some of the standard digital forensic tools. This
paper highlights the need for an approach that enables digital investigators to prioritize
social network artefacts to be further analysed; determine social connections in the context
of an investigation e.g. a user’s social relationships, how recovered artefacts came to be, and
how they can successfully be used as evidence in court.
Keywords: digital evidence, digital forensics, social networking, relationship attribution
1. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of social networking sites
has improved ways in which users engage and
form relationships with people of similar in-
terests; going beyond the days of email com-
munications to the use of social networking
applications to share messages, photos and
videos. It has also provided the opportunity
for some users to perpetrate unlawful activ-
ities.
Social networking presents challenges to
digital forensic investigations for example,
content posted may not always be written to
permanent storage media. In addition, com-
munication content can be altered or deleted
after the fact. There is a need for digital
forensic investigators to be able to recover
such messages or other evidence which may
be used to infer user activity and sufficiently
attribute an action/actions to a user.
Evidence from social networking activity
may be required in different types of crim-
inal or corporate investigations. The type
of evidence recovered helps the investigator
obtain useful information that could:
• Guide the initial stages of an investiga-
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tion e.g. determining if a based on the
evidence recovered, suspect is worth in-
vestigating further.
• Generate new leads which may lead to
the:
– Identification of other persons,
places or items of interest.
– Identification of other potential
sources of digital evidence to facil-
itate decision making.
1.1 Contribution
The key contribution of this paper is the
proposal of a two-stage model for evidence
recovery and investigations involving social
networking activities. It aims to help inves-
tigators prioritize digital evidence and max-
imize efficiency where resources are limited
by focusing on extracting meaningful infor-
mation from social networking artefacts. It
is focused on the prompt identification and
interpretation of associated artefacts and is
aimed at enabling the analyst to quickly de-
termine whether to expand or narrow the
scope of an investigation.
1.2 Paper Structure
The rest of this paper is structured as fol-
lows: related work is discussed in Section
2. Section 3 proposes a two-stage model
for social networking investigation in digital
forensics. Section 4 discusses the experimen-
tal and analysis methodologies for this work.
The research results and the implementation
of the proposed model is presented in Section
5. Finally, the conclusions and potential fu-
ture work stemming from this research are
presented in Section 6.
2. LITERATURE
REVIEW
This section provides a background on re-
lated work in digital forensics and social net-
working investigations. It discusses the re-
quirements for admissibility of digital evi-
dence and the evidential value of data gen-
erated as a result of user social networking
activity.
2.1 Digital Evidence
Digital evidence can be described as any
data that can be used to determine intent,
culpability, how an event occurred, and the
parties involved. It is useful in the inves-
tigation of a range of computer crimes and
non-computer related crimes where evidence
from a digital device may be used to link a
suspect to an offence (Casey, 2011).
Casey defines digital evidence as “data
stored or transmitted using a computer, that
supports or refutes a theory on how an
event occurred”. Digital evidence is cru-
cial in digital investigation and thus must
be acquired in a forensically sound manner
(McKemmish, 2008) to ensure that its ad-
missibility in a court of law.
ACPO (2012)’s definition of digital evi-
dence encompasses a range of artefacts that
can be found on digital devices for example
system log files, application logs etc. Mul-
tiple devices with various artefacts, whilst
ideal sources of digital evidence, present the
challenge of “weeding out” information not
directly relevant to the case. When time is
of the essence, an investigator needs to be
able to adequately identify devices that con-
tain evidence pertinent to the case, and use
the intelligence obtained from those devices
to progress the investigation.
Although the processing of digital evi-
dence varies across jurisdictions, there are
a few requirements digital evidence needs to
meet before it is deemed admissible in court
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(Casey, 2005, 2002; Murr, 2007; Sommer,
1999):
• Evidence submitted must be relevant
to the case.
• The evidence must be reliable.
• The methods used to produce the evi-
dence must be repeatable and should
produce the same results when applied
independently by a third party.
• The evidence must be authentic (gen-
uine) and can be verified using hash val-
ues generated prior to and after imaging
a device.
• The evidence must be valid and er-
ror free. In exceptional circumstances
where evidence acquisition from an ac-
tive device is required, the process must
be accurately documented, and any al-
teration accounted for.
• The evidence must be trustwor-
thy and believable beyond reasonable
doubt.
In order to be admissible in court, evi-
dence from social networking activity must
satisfy these requirements.
2.2 Social Networking
Social networking has been defined as “the
activity of sharing information and commu-
nicating with groups of people using the
internet, especially through websites that
are specially designed for this purpose”
(Cambridge University Press, 2019). It en-
ables users to connect with others and to
form personal or business relationships.
In the context of digital evidence acqui-
sition, social network activity provides a
plethora of digital evidence to investigators.
Artefacts from web browser history, cache,
cookies etc. can be used to determine and
infer a relationship between a user and a
social network account or another user and
may also be used to attribute an action to
a user. This includes, but is not limited to,
determining dates and times of access, user-
names, session information etc.
In spite of the advantages presented by
social networking applications (instant mes-
saging, sharing personal events, micro blog-
ging, personal or corporate marketing, ad-
vertising etc.), it has also been known to
present a means for a small minority of
users to engage in disagreeable or crimi-
nal activities (Bello & DiBlasio, 2013; Jon-
sson, 2011; Osborne, 2010; Richards, 2007;
Rankin, 2010; Select Committee on Com-
munications, 2014; BBC News, 2012; Moore,
2014; McGuire, 2019a)
Investigating a user’s (or suspect’s) social
network activity may be required for several
reasons such as the collection of evidence
to be used in court for the prosecution of
an offender or for use in disciplinary actions
taken against employees who abuse corpo-
rate Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) (Taylor,
Haggerty, Gresty, Almond, & Berry, 2014).
The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)
(2018) proceed to trial once they are satisfied
with the evidence obtained during investi-
gations involving social networking activity.
However, there are no defined guidelines for
digital forensic investigators with regards to
prioritizing evidence collection and the man-
agement of artefacts related to social net-
working.
Taylor et al. (2014) suggests that although
there are no specific guidelines for the foren-
sic investigation of social networking ap-
plications, ACPO Guidelines can be used
as a starting point for the investigation of
offences committed through or with a so-
cial networking application. It can thus
be inferred that the lack of defined guide-
lines often results in such investigations be-
ing broadly categorized under ‘web browser
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forensics’ (Cusack & Son, 2012) due to the
nature of access on a computer (while com-
parable, access through mobile devices is not
considered here as it is considered outside
the scope of this paper). However, it is sug-
gested that focus on features specific to so-
cial networks e.g. user IDs, profile IDs, etc.
can also be used as a viable technique for ev-
idence acquisition using methods tailored to
web browser forensics.
Keyvanpour, Moradi, and Hasanzadeh
(2014) presents a three-phase framework
for social network forensics however, the
specifics and potential location of artefacts of
interest and techniques for recovery were not
discussed. Oh, Lee, and Lee (2011) proposed
an integrated method for the collection and
analysis of web browser evidence where mul-
tiple web browsers have been used in the
commission of an offence. This is based on
the need to recover and utilize data created
and stored on disk when a user accesses so-
cial networking sites using a web browser.
It is important to note that due to the na-
ture and flexibility of social networking ap-
plications, materials posted or shared can be
later modified or deleted. In such situations,
the service provider may be in a position to
provide the evidence required to determine
the author, when content was modified (or
deleted) and reconstruct events. However,
activities such as evidence retrieval from ser-
vice providers is considered out of scope for
this paper as most practitioners, for exam-
ple in the UK, will not have access to the
service provider hence the reliance on “dead
disk” forensics which is more common and
accessible.
Although at the time of writing there
is a research gap in the use of social net-
work artefacts as digital evidence (Powell
& Haynes, 2019; Huber et al., 2011; Jang
& Kwak, 2015; Zainudin, Merabti, &
Llewellyn-Jones, 2011; Shaw, Das, & Mehdi,
2016; Arshad, Jantan, & Omolara, 2019;
Taylor et al., 2014), there are a number
of reported cases where evidence from so-
cial networking activity has successfully led
to prosecution (Wood, 2018; Agency, 2015;
Press Association, 2014; Bowcott, Carter, &
Clifton, 2011; Haroon & Carter, 2010; BBC,
2010).
In discussing evidence collection from so-
cial network activity, Arshad et al. (2019)
grouped social network artefacts into four
distinct classes, User, Activity, Network and
Content:
• User: consists of user data such as pro-
file information, name, email address,
phone numbers etc.
• Activity: consists of a timeline of user
actions logged by the service provider
on the server side e.g. dates and time of
activity, location information, source of
post e.g. phone, tablet, third party app
etc. These types of artefacts are cre-
ated as a result of user actions on the so-
cial networking site for example, when a
user posts a comment about the service
at a restaurant, the service provider tags
the comment with the date and time
it’s posted (see Figure 1). The location
may also be included if geolocation is
enabled. The user is unable to directly
modify these types of artefacts.
• Network: consists of personal so-
cial connections such as individuals or
groups following or being followed by a
user.
• Content: consists of materials published
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Figure 1. Activity time, date, source of tweet, number of retweets and likes illustrating
server-side elements (source: https://www.twitter.com)
by a user such as photos, videos, tweets,
retweets, shares etc.
Artefacts from each group can indepen-
dently be used to infer user activity and
when combined can be used to corroborate
other related artefacts found on disk.
It is important to note that there is cur-
rently a knowledge gap with regards to for-
malizing the acquisition and analysis of so-
cial network artefacts. Some of the exist-
ing (traditional) digital forensic tools are
not wholly designed for social networking in-
vestigations and the capability for targeted
searches or the ability of the tool to inter-
pret and present the evidence in a human
readable format may be limited (Cusack &
Son, 2012). For example, artefacts like Win-
dows Registry Hives, Event logs, SQLite
databases may need to be extracted and an-
alyzed with a third-party tool. The objec-
tive of this paper is consequently to propose
an approach that can be applied as a formal
technique for social network investigations.
2.3 Extracting Features from
Social Networking
Artefacts
Due to the proliferation of devices and the
volume of data investigators need to process,
it is often crucial to quickly identify content
of interest prior to a detailed analysis of a
seized device. Feature extraction is an ap-
proach that enables investigators to process
vast quantities of data in an efficient man-
ner (see Garfinkel (2006, 2013) for more on
feature extraction).
A user’s interaction with a digital de-
vice (computer) is a two-way process aptly
explained by Locard’s Exchange Principle
(Chisum & Turvey, 2000) which states that
every contact leaves a trace (Locard 1934,
pp. 7-8 as cited in Chisum and Turvey (2007,
pp. 23-24)). With regards to digital evi-
dence, this principle can be adopted to ex-
plain the existence of artefacts created as a
result of user activity. For example, creating
a user account; installing an application such
as a web browser; or visiting social network-
ing sites, all leave traces that can be used to
infer what a user has done.
In the context of this paper, feature iden-
tification (and extraction) is described as the
process of identifying and extracting arte-
facts containing key information about a
user’s social networking activities. Features
in this context can be extracted from the ab-
solute path of a given URL or other related
artefacts such as HTML or JSON data, us-
ing pattern matching methods such as Reg-
ular Expressions (RegEx). The reoccurrence
of a given feature can thus be attributed to
a user’s repeated access to a resource on a
social networking site (Garfinkel, 2006).
2.3.1 Identify Features in URLs
Every website visited by a user has a URL
which indicates where resources are located,
and the protocol used in accessing those
resources. RFC 1738 describes URL as a
compact string representation for a resource
available via the Internet (Berners-Lee, Mas-
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inter, & McCahill, 1994). It also describes
the URL syntax as being made up of the fol-
lowing components:
<scheme>:<scheme-specific-part>
The <scheme> part of the syntax defines
the protocol used e.g. ftp, http; while the
<scheme-specific-part> varies and is depen-
dent on the protocol used. For example,
two typical protocols comprise of:
ftp://user@host.domain/directory/filename
or
http://domain name/path/query-searchpart-parameter
-fragment
An example of a HTTP URL with three
parts is shown in Figure 2. The query or
searchpart of a URL may also be complex,
having several parameters as seen in Figure
3. Some URLs may also specify subdomains
or port numbers.
Figure 2. An example showing the parts of a HTTP URL
Figure 3. Example HTTP URL with multiple query or searchpart parameters
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URLs can be generated in several ways for
example, clicking on a link in an email or a
web page; clicking a bookmark or a short-
cut; typing an address in the browser address
bar, or using the autocomplete feature in the
browser as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. An example of the URL autocomplete/suggestion feature
URLs can provide a lot of information
about what a user has been doing online
– from pages accessed, to content searched
for or shared. For this research, considering
that URL structure is not browser depen-
dent, identifying features in URLs involves
decomposing the URL and decoding every-
thing after the protocol part of the URL
(i.e. <scheme-specific-part>) and in some
instances, everything after the domain name
part. This includes the path, parameters
and their values and fragments.
For investigations involving social net-
work activities, finding and recovering ac-
tionable intelligence/evidence will help nar-
row the scope and refocus an investigation,
thus maximizing the use of the investigator’s
time. Although there has been research in
the forensic investigation of online activity
and web browser artefacts, there is knowl-
edge gap with regards to the deconstruction
of individual URLs in relation to social net-
working activity. There is also limited re-
search specifically focused on the modelling
of social network forensic investigations pro-
cesses and the extraction of features from de-
constructed URLs.
The research described in this paper high-
lights the need for a concise model for the in-
vestigation and analysis of such social media
related artefacts. It also highlights the im-
portance of features in understanding user
intent and the attribution of actions to a
user.
3. PROPOSED MODEL
Building on the identified need for a new ap-
proach to forensic analysis of social media
data, there are two key areas to consider;
understanding user activity and the types of
artefacts which this can generate, as well as
the links between the two.
3.1 Understanding “User
Activity”
In general, there are three basic ways a user
interacts with a computer:
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1. Create/modify: This includes the cre-
ation of new files e.g. documents; mod-
ifying existing files; installing applica-
tions, file upload or download.
2. Read/access: This includes accessing
files with read, write, execute permis-
sions. This type of interaction includes
actions like launching a web browser
(execute); generating an entry in the
browser history (write); opening a folder
or file (read).
3. Delete/remove files: This includes de-
liberate or unintentional removal of a
file or application e.g. uninstall, delete.
In the context of this paper, user activ-
ity falls into three broad groups comprised
of a mix of the basic interactions described
above:
• Pre-browser activities:
– These set of activities create (or
modify) artefacts that can be
used to infer user activity. For ex-
ample, powering on a device (com-
puter) or a login would create an
entry in the event log. Installing
an application would create arte-
facts associated with setup and
configuration. Launching the web
browser would read (with execute
permission), the executable file to
start the browser; create a file, or
an entry in the associated browser
profile directory, which can be used
to determine when a browser ses-
sion was initiated.
• Browser activities:
– These set of activities create (or
modify), read (access) artefacts
that can be used in inferring user
activity. For example, navigat-
ing to a website by typing a URL
in the address bar; clicking on
a website shortcut; selecting an
autocomplete URL suggestion in
browser may modify the existing
state of the browser history (e.g.
the SQLite database) by creating
new records based on the user’s ac-
tivity.
– Activities such as accessing re-
sources on a website, e.g. posts,
uploads, downloads; would also
create/modify entries in the ses-
sion files, browser history, cache,
etc. These activities also read
(access) the browser cache to
check that the associated content
requested is in date and would
modify the cache to update the
content as required.
• Post-browser activities:
– These set of activities also per-
form create (or modify), read
(access , write or execute) op-
erations. For example, exiting/-
closing the web browser, may cause
some of the contents in memory to
be written to disk; logging off or
powering off the device would cre-
ate a corresponding entry in the
event logs.
– In some instances, delete
(remove) operations may oc-
cur where a browser is configured
to“clear” content when the
browser is closed. Delete opera-
tions as part of user activities are
considered out of scope for this
paper.
At each point during any form of inter-
action with a device (pre-browser, browser
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and post-browser), artefacts are created al-
lowing inference of what occurred. In any
investigation where there is more than one
user account on the device, to prove an ac-
tion was initiated by a user, it is important
to identify and highlight artefacts (includ-
ing corroborating evidence) that determine
whether the user being investigated was at
the keyboard of the device in question within
the timeframe of an incident.
3.2 Linking an Artefact to
User Activity
Artefacts found on a digital device following
the range of activities described in Section
3.1 can be broadly identified as system gen-
erated and user generated artefacts (Mabuto
& Venter, 2012). This highlights the dis-
tinction between an artefact created by the
system in the course of user activity and
an artefact created as a result of direct in-
put/interaction from a user as discussed be-
low:
• System generated artefacts: these are
artefacts created by the operating sys-
tem (OS) or an application on the com-
puter when core OS functions are per-
formed by the OS or when a user per-
forms tasks that require or trigger core
OS services. These artefacts can be
described as context artefacts because
they can be used to support other arte-
facts recovered during an investigation
and they also give context to the type
of user activities that may have led to
their creation. Examples include:
– Event logs created during user
login/logout activity (pre-browser;
post-browser activities) could be
used to infer a user had access and
credentials for a device, and to con-
nect a user to a timeframe of inter-
est.
– Setup or configuration artefacts
created as local files or as records
when an application or device
driver is installed; including arte-
facts that are modified when a
function is enabled/disabled by a
user (pre-browser activity) could
be used to provide context to the
existence of an application (e.g. a
web browser). The artefact (e.g.
a Prefetch file, Registry entry) can
thus be attributed to user activity
(i.e. installing the web browser).
• User generated artefacts: these are arte-
facts created as a result of a user’s
direct interaction with an application.
These artefacts can be described as
case-specific artefacts and form the ba-
sis of inferences made about user be-
havior. They often create associated
system generated artefacts which can
be used to contextualize the activity.
In the context of this paper, these
refer to artefacts created during pre-
browser, browser and post-browser ac-
tivities. Examples include:
– Installing a web browser (pre-
browser activity) would create
artefacts such as browser profile di-
rectories where the user’s browser
activities are stored. These arte-
facts can be attributed to user
actions such as running an ex-
ecutable file to install the web
browser. This can be linked to the
system generated artefacts which
are created as a result of this type
of activity.
– Accessing a website (browser ac-
tivity) involves direct input by the
user through typing in a URL or
clicking on hyperlinks as discussed
in Section 3.1. Artefacts indicating
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visits to websites can be attributed
to a user launching a web browser
and providing the input (URL or
click) required to access the web-
site(s).
– File downloads from a visited web-
site is another example of an arte-
fact that could be attributed to
user activity. The sequence of ac-
tivity and user clicks on hyper-
links, as recorded in the browser
history, and leading up to the file
download may be used to corrobo-
rate the existence of a local copy.
– User activity may also create arte-
facts inferring the deletion/ re-
moval of files; and the uninstal-
lation of applications and drivers.
These activities are also deemed
out of scope for this paper.
3.2.1 Sources of Determination for
Investigators
There are several ways an investigator can
build a picture or reconstruct an event and
attribute actions to a user based on the sys-
tem and user generated artefacts recovered.
These include but are not limited to using:
• Local Files: Created, modified, ac-
cessed dates and times can be deter-
mined when files resident on the device
are analyzed.
• URLs: By deconstructing the URL,
it is possible to determine what sites
have been visited and what the user
had typed in the address bar or search
box e.g.: search?q=statlerwaldorf\
&src=typd
• System setup or configuration logs:
This infers when an application was in-
stalled; a file was created, number of
times run or accessed, last time an ap-
plication was run, or a file was accessed.
It may also contain the path to Event
logs.
• System Event logs: Logging is a way for
the OS to record information about sys-
tem activities that occur. This includes
date and time of event; hostname/com-
puter name of device involved; user-
name of who was logged in to the ma-
chine when the event occurred; the pro-
gram that triggered the event etc. In
Windows, an identification number is
assigned to each event type (Ultimate
IT Security, 2014).
Attribution in the context of this paper
requires an approach that links a user (or
user account) to the web activity being in-
vestigated. The two-stage model proposed in
this paper can be used to achieve this. This
model is intended to produce case-specific
and context artefacts in a social networking
investigation:
i Case-specific artefacts: these can be de-
scribed as artefacts that can be directly
attributed to an action/activity of inter-
est. For example, this feature “A” from
the URL “Y” infers that the user clicked
on the “X” tab on Twitter.
ii Context artefacts: these can be de-
scribed as artefacts that provide an ex-
planation of how another artefact oc-
curred. For example, clicking on a tab
or link on a web page generates a new
URL however, HTTP headers or the
JSON artefacts for the browser will in-
dicate if a link was clicked as well as
if there is a referrer URL. Context arte-
facts may also include artefacts that are
expected to occur as a result of a user’s
activity on a social networking site. For
example, the existence of photos from a
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social media profile in the cache could
be attributed to a visit to that pro-
file. This is discussed further in Section
5.1.2.
3.3 Two-Stage Model
Details of the proposed model are presented
Figure 5.
Figure 5. A schematic illustration of the proposed two-stage model for the investigations of
social network activity
Stage 1: URL feature extraction
The first stage of this model involves the
identification and recovery of URLs from
disk and the extraction of features from the
URLs. The URL in this instance is the
main/core source of features for online ac-
tivity. For example, the social network site
visited, or the actions performed by the user
(search, follow). It is important to note that
URLs are not platform dependent, so this
approach can be applied to any platform (i.e.
OS or browser).
Features are extracted using a combina-
tion of RegEx and the sqlite3 module in
Python. Artefacts recovered are stored in
CSV files containing the dates and times of
activity, the full URL, and extracted fea-
ture(s) which can be used to infer user ac-
tivity or allude to the user’s intent.
Stage 2: Corroborating evidence Cor-
roborating artefacts validate each piece of
evidence found during an investigation. In
the context of this paper, corroborating arte-
facts provide both confirmation and supple-
mentary information about the artefacts re-
covered during the URL feature extraction
stage.
This stage of the model involves the iden-
tification and recovery of artefacts that vali-
date what a URL feature indicates. These
types of artefacts provide context to the
features extracted from a URL. For exam-
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ple, the HTTP header information in the
cache may show a URL that contains “/set-
tings/account” was created as a result of
clicking on the “account” link in the page
“settings” causing the browser to respond
by updating the URL and rendering the re-
quested content. In addition to information
derived from HTTP headers found in the
browser cache (or unallocated space), meta-
data from the web page HTML could be use-
ful in understanding the user’s interaction
with the social networking site.
This stage also involves the recovery of
core OS artefacts that backup what has been
inferred of the user’s activity. For exam-
ple, downloaded files associated with the
recovered URLs; a local copy of uploaded
data (associated with a “www.domain-name/
upload” URL); artefacts indicating that a
downloaded application was installed and
run “X” number of times including the phys-
ical path of the application; artefacts verify-
ing application paths.
The proposed model is useful for both the
recovery of actionable intelligence and for fo-
cusing and ensuring a structured investiga-
tion. Having a “URL feature extraction”
stage takes the bulk of URL artefacts and
extracts meaningful information from them.
This is useful because the digital forensic in-
vestigator needs a clear understanding of the
URL structure in order to extract usable in-
formation from it. When artefacts from the
“URL” stage have been extracted, corrob-
orating (supplementary) artefacts are used
to contextualize events and help digital ev-
idence meet the requirement to be beyond
reasonable doubt.
This paper presents work that improves
on existing research on the forensic investi-
gation of social network activities. It pro-
vides context by identifying and highlight-
ing the importance of artefacts that corrob-
orate or supplement the extracted feature(s).
This includes data in URLs which ordinarily
may be missed due to the volume of informa-
tion returned by conventional digital foren-
sics tools; data from HTTP headers and gen-
eral browser artefacts.
4. RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY
This section presents the data generation
and analysis methodology for this paper.
4.1 Data Generation
The experiments for this paper were con-
ducted in virtual environments running Win-
dows 7 and Windows 10 respectively with
Firefox browser installed via an executable
in a network shared folder. Firefox version
61 was installed with rolling updates up to
version 69.
The purpose of these experiments was to
simulate real life activity on a social net-
working site and to create a feasible model
for investigating such activities. The need to
ensure the repeatability of the experiments
made it necessary to use a virtual environ-
ment.
During the experimental phase, Fiddler
(Telerik, 2018) was used to capture HTTP
requests in order to understand how individ-
ual parts of a URL can be deconstructed;
what was sent to the web server and the re-
sponse returned to the client (web browser);
what was cached eventually irrespective of
“no-cache” options in the header etc.
Data generation for this paper involved
creating a local user account in the Windows
virtual machine (VM) and creating a user ac-
count on Twitter using Firefox. Normal user
activity was simulated by conducting a va-
riety of the activities listed below over the
course of the experiment:
• Power on the VM and log in
• Launch the web browser
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• Login to the test user account on Twit-
ter
• Searching for users to follow
• Sending tweets
• Reply and retweet
• Viewing and sending Direct Messages
(DMs)
• Send follow requests to other test user
accounts
• Viewing and accepting follow requests
• Updating the test user account privacy
settings
• Continuous scrolling and viewing the
test user account timeline
During the experiments, all activity was
logged in a contemporaneous note as a
means of verifying the user activity against
the results found during the analysis.
4.2 Data Analysis
The analysis was conducted in a Windows 10
desktop environment using existing digital
forensics tools. This was done to identify and
understand artefacts of interest in a social
networking investigation and to help with
the implementation of the proposed model.
The data analysis covered core OS artefacts
and user generated artefacts, and a multi-
tool analysis technique was employed. The
following tools were used:
• General examination tool:
– WinHex (X-Ways Software Tech-
nology, AG, 2018): this was used
to view the virtual disk contents
and for the extraction of arte-
facts to be analyzed with third-
party tools (listed below). It was
also used for simultaneous key-
word search. WinHex simultane-
ous search function allows a list
of search terms (one per line) to
be searched at once. It is impor-
tant to note that a keyword search
was run across the whole disk im-
age and WinHex would have only
picked up hits (data) that was vis-
ible to it; this limitation means
that it would not have captured
the contents of compound or en-
crypted files.
• Tools used for individual artefact anal-
ysis:
– Registry Decoder (Case &
Marziale, n.d.): this was used
to analyze the registry hives.
– RegRipper (Carvey, 2018): this
was used to validate the results
from Registry Decoder.
– DB Browser for SQLite (DB4S
Project, n.d.): used for the
analysis of user browser SQLite
databases in the user’s Firefox pro-
file.
– MZCacheView (NirSoft, 2018b):
used for the analysis of the Firefox
cache artefacts.
– FullEventLogView (NirSoft,
2018a): used for the analysis of
Windows event logs.
– Prefetch Forensics (Woan, 2013):
used for the analysis of Prefetch
artefacts.
– Python 3 (Python.org, 2019):
python scripts were used to convert
the sessionstore files to JSON for-
mat and to extract features from
the recovered URLs.
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5. RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION
This section discusses the experimental
results, following the proposed two-stage
model approach. These are categorized
into URL feature artefacts and corroborat-
ing artefacts.
5.1 Implementation
Artefacts of interest in this research include
user and system generated artefacts infer-
ring user activity on Twitter. This includes
URLs generated as a result of Twitter ac-
tivity (login, searching for followers, viewing
followers, tweeting etc.) and system gener-
ated artefacts that give context to other arte-
facts and a user’s activity.
5.1.1 URL Feature Artefacts
As discussed in previous sections, features
from URLs can be used to give context to or
infer user action. URL artefacts were recov-
ered from the user’s Firefox Profile using DB
Browser for SQLite. It is important to dif-
ferentiate between the History location and
the Cache location as both folders share the
same name. In this section, when the Firefox
Profile folder is mentioned, it refers to the
folder containing the browser history. The
Cache is discussed in Section 5.1.2.3.
The Firefox profile can be found in:
%APPDATA%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles;
where %APPDATA% is the variable name
for %SYSTEMROOT%\Users\<username>
\AppData\Roaming.
The profile folder contains a subdi-
rectory with a .default extension (e.g.
oeds8ys7.default) which contains the SQLite
database files (shown in Figure 6), session
information files, other files and directories
used by Firefox.
Figure 6. SQLite database files in the Firefox Profile folder
History The browser history is written
to places.sqlite and was analyzed using DB
Browser for SQLite. The query was focused
on URLs indicative of accessing Twitter.
The returned URLs include login, timeline,
search, profile views, and follow/follower ac-
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tivities.
Extracts of the results are shown in Fig-
ure 7 (although the experimental user is fic-
titious, certain parts of the URL have been
modified to remove identifying information).
The extracts show standard Twitter activity
URLs as displayed in the browser address
bar while navigating to different pages and
as recorded by Fiddler during the experi-
ments.
Figure 7. URLs showing user activity (recovered from places.sqlite)
The results from DB Browser for SQLite
were exported and saved in .csv format
ready for URL deconstruction.
Using the contemporaneous notes, the re-
covered URLs were grouped based on the
user activities carried out during the ex-
periments. Tables 1 - 3 show examples of
artefacts indicative of profile/timeline view,
clicking the “followers” hyperlink on the
user’s timeline and viewing follower requests,
respectively.
Table 1. Twitter timeline URL and tab title
URL Tab Title
https://twitter.com/NxxxxxxxOxxx Oxxx Nxxxxxxx (@Nxxxxxxxxxxd) |
Twitter
(User’s home/timeline) (Tab title contains user’s full name and
(@user’s handle))
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Table 2. URL generated when the “followers” link is clicked
URL Tab Title
https://twitter.com/
NxxxxxxxOxxx/followers
People following Oxxx Nxxxxxxx
(@Nxxxxxxxxxxd)
(Created when “followers” is clicked) (Tab title)
Table 3. URL generated when the “followers” link is clicked to view follow requests
URL Tab Title
https://twitter.com/
NxxxxxxxOxxx/follower requests
Oxxx Nxxxxxxx (@Nxxxxxxxxxxd) |
Twitter
(“pending follower requests” is
clicked.)
(Tab title)
During the experiments, the account se-
curity and privacy settings were updated.
This includes making the account private
etc. The user clicked on settings and was
directed to the account page from where se-
curity and privacy settings can be modified.
Tables 4 - 5 show URLs from this activity:
Table 4. URL indicative of account settings modification
URL
https://twitter.com/settings/account
(This URL takes the user to the ‘Account page’ from where the user account settings can be modified.)
Table 5. URL indicative of privacy settings modification
URL
https://twitter.com/settings/safety
(When the user clicks on ‘Privacy and safety’ within settings, this URL is created. This
page allows the user to set tweets as private, disable location tagging etc.)
To attribute these artefacts to actions per-
formed, it was necessary to review the HTTP
request and response headers captured by
Fiddler. This was done to determine if an
unrelated activity could have caused the cre-
ation of these artefacts.
The next step was to break down the
URLs into manageable components, the csv
and re modules in Python 3 were used as
seen in the example code extract below. The
features including the date and time of ac-
cess were written to a csv file using a version
of the code illustrated below:
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1. import csv
2. import re
3.
4. # open the csv file
5. with open("history.csv") as hist:
6. # read the csv file
7. readCSV = csv.reader(hist, delimiter=’,’)
8. for row in csv file:
9. for item in row:
10. if ‘twitter’ in item:
11. pattern = your_regex_pattern
12. regex_search = re.compile(pattern, re.IGNORECASE)
13. matches = regexp.findall(item)
14.
15. # write regex match to a csv file
16. with open("matched_patterns.csv", ’a’) as mp:
17. mp.write("{0}, {1}".format(row[0], ’,’.join(matches)) + ’\n’)
The examples below are some of the saved
feature matches; they are intended to help
an analyst make sense of how an event hap-
pened. For example, the user accessed Twit-
ter on date and time, then the user navigated
to this part of the page; the user searched for
this other user, viewed their profile and sta-
tus etc.
When sorted by the date and time of ac-
tivity, it can be used to recreate a probable
timeline of activity.
2016-01-17 21H:09M:49S, twitter.com, MissPiggy?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle
2018-12-01 18H:18M:12S, twitter.com, login
2018-12-01 18H:18M:13S, twitter.com, i, notifications
2018-12-01 18H:21M:14S, twitter.com, settings, account
2018-12-01 18H:21M:14S, twitter.com, settings, safety
2018-12-01 18H:21M:52S, twitter.com, Nxxxxxxxxxxd, followers
2018-12-01 18H:21M:52S, twitter.com, follower_requests
2018-12-01 18H:21M:52S, twitter.com, Sxxxxxxxh3
2018-12-01 18H:21M:52S, twitter.com, Nxxxxxxxxxxd
2019-11-08 11H:46M:15S, twitter.com, Pxxxxxxxxxd
2019-11-11 15H:14M:45S, twitter.com, DxxxxxKxxxx, with_replies
2019-12-24 11H:53M:39S, twitter.com, jxxxxhxxxxx, status, 544385844081987584
5.1.2 Corroborating Artefacts
Corroborating artefacts as discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3 are artefacts that provide context to
the URL artefacts recovered using the two-
stage model proposed in this paper. This
section discusses corroborating artefacts as
they relate to the URL artefacts discussed
in the preceding section.
Other SQLite Database Files Cook-
ies.sqlite records cookies set during a brows-
ing session. It provided corroborating in-
formation for the features that were recov-
ered from URLs in Section 5.1.1.1. Fig-
ure 8 shows a cookie set for the path “set-
tings/safety”.
c© 2020 JDFSL Page 17
JDFSL N2 A Two-Stage Model
Figure 8. Cookies set in cookies.sqlite indicates the setting/safety page was accessed on
twitter.com
The cookie information can be used in
conjunction with other artefacts such as lo-
gin credentials shown in Figure 9, to deter-
mine and link the user account to the brows-
ing session where the activity of interest oc-
curred.
Figure 9. Login credentials from formhistory.sqlite shows the last time the recorded email
address was used
Formhistory.sqlite records entries made in
form fields in Firefox. These are stored in
key:value pairs where the fieldname is the
key, and the entry typed into a text field
is the value. Information recovered shows
the login username for the user’s Twitter ac-
count and the last time the username was
used. This can be used to infer user login
activity with regards to an activity and time
frame of interest.
Webappsstore.sqlite stores data for web-
sites in key:value pairs. In this instance,
the value of the typeahead :userHash key
contained information on the user’s Twit-
ter account including that of over 500 other
Twitter users. This amount of information
can be overwhelming however, using features
such as @user handle, user id, profile id, ex-
tracted from the URLs, it can be filtered
down to a manageable size.
Artefacts from webappsstore such as the
values of “followed by” and “following”
within “social context” as seen in Figure 10,
can be used to infer a user’s social connec-
tion (relationship) to other users.
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Figure 10. Extracts from webappsstore.sqlite contain JSON data that can be used to deter-
mine a user’s follow/following status on Twitter
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Session Information Artefacts support-
ing follow activity identified during the
URL extraction stage were recovered from
Firefox sessionstore. Sessionstore (as at
the time of writing) is stored in a com-
pressed file format (MOZLZ4/JSONLZ4)
in the browser profile folder and is used
by Firefox to manage the ability to restore
currently open windows and tabs in the
event of a crash or forced restart. It can
also be used to open previous tabs on
startup following a clean exit. The following
files are also used to store session data:
%APPDATA%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\
<profile-folder>\sessionstore
-backups\
• previous.jsonlz4
• recovery.baklz4
• upgrade.jsonlz4-[datetimestamp] (ses-
sion state before a browser version
upgrade)
The information of interest in sessionstore
include URL, page title, referrer URL; time
a tab was last accessed or closed; the time a
window was last accessed or closed; session
start/last updated time; cookies associated
with the session.
The sessionstore file was decompressed
from LZ4 to JSON format, using the lz4
module in Python 3. When analyzed, it
provided information on the user session
where the account settings were accessed
thus corroborating the activities inferred by
the URLs (Section 5.1.1) as shown in Figures
11 - 14.
Figure 11. JSON (sessionstore) artefacts showing session where user account settings were
accessed
JSON artefacts such as the extracts shown
in Figure 12 are useful in identifying the ses-
sion a URL is part of, and any associated
(referrer) URL.
This information can be used when recon-
structing how a user arrived at a specific part
of the website.
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Figure 12. JSON (sessionstore) artefacts showing referrer URL through which the user
reached “followers”
As observed during the experiments, when
another user’s profile is viewed, the URL dis-
played in the address bar contains the user-
name or identifier for the visited profile.
Thus, the results can be used to infer that
when a recovered URL contains a username
or identifier other than that of the logged in
user, it indicates a visit to the other user’s
profile.
Figure 13 shows a visit to the profile of
another user (URL) and the tweet sent by
the experimental user.
Figure 13. JSON (sessionstore) artefacts indicate the user visited another user’s profile and
sent a tweet
In order to establish timelines, it is impor-
tant to review the session within which the
activity of interest occurred as shown in Fig-
ure 14. This would corroborate visit times
indicated in the browser history and would
also identify other activities that may have
occurred within the timeframe of interest.
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Figure 14. JSON (sessionstore) artefacts showing the last accessed date and time for a
session. Timestamp decoded by DCode
Cache The Firefox cache can be found
in: %SYSTEMROOT%\Users\<username>
\AppData\Local\Mozilla\Firefox\
Profile. The profile directory contains a
subdirectory with a .default extension and
an identical name to that of the history
profile folder (see Section 5.1.1).
During the analysis of the cache, arte-
facts recovered were indicative of a user’s di-
rect interaction with other users for example,
profile banners and profile photo URLs and
images. These URLs validated the contents
recovered from webappsstore.sqlite (Figure
10) and sessionstore. Extracts are shown be-
low in Figures 15 and 16:
Figure 15. Extract of user profile data from webappsstore.sqlite
Figure 16. Extract of user profile image from the cache
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It was observed that some of the
http://pbs.twimg.com URLs were for pro-
files the experimental user did not interact
with. This behavior is somewhat expected,
depending on the browser in use, as page el-
ements are stored locally pending a refresh
when the cached content is out of date as
discussed in Section 3.1.
Just as observed with the webappsstore
artefacts, the URLs can be grouped into
a separate category after the features ex-
tracted in Section 5.1.1.1 have been used to
filter out the URLs of interest indicating so-
cial networking activity.
It is important to note that some of the
URLs recovered from the cache were as a
result of background processes on Twitter.
For example, hashflags and hashtags.
Hashflags can be described as custom
emojis that accompany a hashtag (e.g.
#StarWars ) and are used by Twitter to
promote events. For example:
https://abs.twimg.com/hashflags/Amazon_Holiday_2018/Amazon_Holiday_2018.png
https://abs.twimg.com/hashflags/WB_LegoMovie_Emmet/WB_LegoMovie_Emmet.png
Hashflag URLs may be cached even
though they have not been viewed or used
by the user. An example of a hashflag URL
recovered from the cache is shown below:
7109699712 68 74 74 70 73 3A 2F 2F 61 62 73 2E 74 77 69 6D https://abs.twim
7109699728 67 2E 63 6F 6D 2F 68 61 73 68 66 6C 61 67 73 2F g.com/hashflags/
7109699744 57 42 5F 4C 65 67 6F 4D 6F 76 69 65 5F 45 6D 6D WB_LegoMovie_Emm
7109699760 65 74 2F 57 42 5F 4C 65 67 6F 4D 6F 76 69 65 5F et/WB_LegoMovie_
7109699776 45 6D 6D 65 74 2E 70 6E 67 00 E5 00 00 00 00 00 Emmet.png å
Hashtag URLs from the “Trends for you”
frame on the user’s Twitter homepage were
also recovered. The user also did not inter-
act with this part of Twitter or use hashtags
during the experiment. Examples of hashtag
URLs recovered from the cache are:
https://twitter.com/hashtag/Disney?src=hash
https://twitter.com/hashtag/RoaldDahl?src=hash
https://twitter.com/hashtag/StarTrek?src=hash
https://twitter.com/hashtag/WrathOfKhan?src=hash
An extract of the hashtag URLs recovered from the cache is shown below:
7096393600 68 74 74 70 73 3A 2F 2F https://
7096393616 74 77 69 74 74 65 72 2E 63 6F 6D 2F 68 61 73 68 twitter.com/hash
7096393632 74 61 67 2F 57 72 61 74 68 4F 66 4B 68 61 6E 3F tag/WrathOfKhan?
7096393648 73 72 63 3D 68 61 73 68 00 src=hash
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Some of the recovered URLs were from
suggested/promoted tweets advertised on
the user’s timeline. It is important to note
that these ads and sponsored content can be
found on disk even when a user hasn’t clicked
on them. In the context of this paper, they
were a result of continuous scrolling on the
user timeline. These tweets can be identified
by the example features highlighted below:
https :// twitter.com/ i / cards /tfw/v1 /1056932085485658113?
advertiser name=NespressoUK&Ireland &cardname=unified_card&
is following advertiser=false &forward=true&impression_id =358a
4182 a9a96b66&edge=true&lang=en&card_height =271& scribe context=
"client":"web","page":"home","section":"home","component":"tweet" &
bearer_token=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAPYXBAAAAAAACLXUNDekMxqa8h /4
0K4moUkGsoc=TYfbDKbT3jJPCEVnMYqilB28NHfOPqkca3qaAxGfsyKCs0wR
bw# xdm e=https://twitter.com &xdm_c=default4701&xdm_p=1
xdm is cross-domain messaging and
the expected value for xdm e is the
base URL of the host. As shown
in the URL above, the base URL is
https://twitter.com. To determine whether
a user is following an advertiser, the value
for “is following advertiser” would be
“true”.
Figure 17 shows an extract of HTTP
Request and Response headers captured
through Fiddler, which was used to moni-
tor Twitter traffic during the experiments.
Fiddler was used to determine what was ex-
pected to be written to disk, what eventu-
ally was written to disk, and what was not
written to disk. The ad URLs captured by
Fiddler corroborate the Twitter advertising
URL recovered from the user’s Firefox cache.
They show that the background processes on
Twitter can be written to disk.
Figure 17. Extracts from Fiddler showing the HTTP Request and Response for the cached
sponsored content
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Due to the volume of cached data, and
although they may not be used for user rela-
tionship attribution, it is important to iden-
tify and highlight social networking artefacts
that are unrelated to direct user interaction.
This would help an investigator/analyst fo-
cus on artefacts of immediate interest. For
example, grouping sponsored content into
different categories, separating them from
normal user accounts.
Registry and Event Logs The artefacts
presented in this section come from a range
of sources (system and user generated) as
discussed in Section 3.2. They aim to an-
swer questions such as the number of user
accounts on the system; the logged in user;
dates and times of activity; applications in-
stalled or accessed; paths to files and appli-
cations etc.
Where there are multiple user accounts on
a device, it is important to identify regis-
tered account(s) of interest, credentials, per-
missions and dates and time of access. These
can be identified and recovered by analyzing
the SAM registry hive and reviewing Win-
dows Event logs.
The hive files (Table 6) were extracted us-
ing WinHex and information about the user
account such as when the account was cre-
ated, the username, the account type, ap-
plication (browser) installation, and access
were identified and recovered.
Table 6. Registry hives extracted with WinHex
Hive Location
SAM %SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config
SECURITY
SOFTWARE
SYSTEM
NTUSER.DAT %SYSTEMROOT%\Users\<username>
UsrClass.dat %SYSTEMROOT%\Users\<username>\AppData\Microsoft\Windows
The SAM hive provided information
about the user accounts, date and time cre-
ated and last login time. The last login date
and time can be used to corroborate session
information recovered from sessionstore:
Username : Oxxx Nxxxxxxx [1000]
Full Name :
User Comment :
Account Type : Default Admin User
Account Created : Sun Sep 25 14:44:15 2016 Z
Name :
Last Login Date : Sat Dec 1 18:12:26 2018 Z
Pwd Reset Date : Sun Sep 25 14:44:15 2016 Z
Pwd Fail Date : Never
Login Count : 8
Extracts from the SYSTEM hive indicate
the path of the Firefox installer in the net-
work shared folder (see Section 4.1), and an
indication that Firefox was executed:
1533971040|REG|||M... AppCompatCache - Z:\shared_installer_files\Firefox\Setup 61.0.2.exe
1533670994|REG|||M... [Program Execution] AppCompatCache - C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\
firefox.exe [Executed]
This type of information recovered from the Registry when cross referenced with
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Event logs (see Figure 19) verifies user ac-
count information and may be used to con-
nect online identities matching the OS ac-
count username e.g. registered social net-
work credentials.
It can also be used to attribute specific
browser (social network activity) sessions to
a user based on login/logoff times correlated
using the “LogonId” as seen in Figures 18
and 19.
Other artefacts of interest were recovered
from NTUSER.DAT, indicating when the
browser (Firefox) was installed, the system
default browser as shown in Table 7, where it
was launched from and the number of times
the browser was launched as shown in Table
8. For example, starting Firefox from the
desktop or taskbar shortcut. This artefact
could help an investigator/analyst corrobo-
rate session and social network activity.
Table 7. URL indicative of account settings modification
Firefox is set as the default browser
StartMenuInternet [Sat Aug 18 18:11:33 2018 (UTC)]
NOTE: default Internet Browser client key
(default) -> Firefox-308046B0AF4A39CB
Table 8. Extract from the Registry showing that Firefox was executed once from Taskbar
shortcut
Browser execution and Run count
Datetime stamp Path Run count
Sat Dec 1 2018 18:19:15 9E3995AB-1F9C-4F13-B827-
48B24B6C7174\TaskBar\Firefox.lnk
1
Event IDs 4720, 4624 and 4647 mean ‘A
user account was created’, ‘An account was
successfully logged on’ and ‘User initiated
logoff’ respectively (Ultimate IT Security,
2014). There are other description fields in
the Windows event logs that can provide ad-
ditional information and context (e.g. Ac-
count Security ID, Domain etc.) but they
are out of scope for this paper. Figures 18,
19 and 20 show extracts from the event logs
indicating account creation and activity.
Figure 18. Account creation dates, time, username (extract from Security Event log)
The artefacts presented in this section pro- vide additional means of contextualizing the
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Figure 19. Login date, time, type and username (extract from Security Event log)
Figure 20. Logoff date, time, and username (extract from Security Event log)
URL artefacts discussed in Section 5.1.1.
These artefacts can be used to corroborate
the inference that the browser activity of
interest as discussed in Section 5.1.2.2, is
within the time frame of the user’s last logon
and logoff on the system.
Prefetch Prefetch is used by Windows for
memory management, speeding up the boot
process and application start up process.
Prefetch files can be found in %SYSTEMROOT%
\Prefetch and have a .pf extension.
Prefetch artefacts can help an investiga-
tor/analyst determine when an application
was installed, when it was last run and the
number of times the application has been
run.
In the context of this research, Prefetch
provides information related to Firefox thus,
corroborating other artefacts recovered pre-
viously (see Tables 7 and 8). Figure 21 is a
Prefetch extract showing when Firefox was
installed, the last time it was run and the
number of times it has been run since instal-
lation.
Figure 21. Firefox last run date and run count
Keyword Search As the last task of the
second stage of the model, a keyword search
was used to recover artefacts resident in
other parts of the disk such as unallocated
space, slack space and pagefile. The simul-
taneous search feature in WinHex was used
to search across a variety of character en-
codings. A keyword search is useful in the
identification and recovery of outlier arte-
facts that may be resident in unstructured
part of a disk where they are not readily vis-
ible or accessible when viewed in a digital
forensics tool.
It is important to use search terms or
strings that would reduce the number of false
positives returned. This may involve us-
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ing some of the features extracted from the
URLs or keys from JSON data discussed in
Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2.2. Examples of the
search terms used include but is not limited
to:
• “followed by”:
• “following”:
• “follower requests”
• “profile image url”
• “is following advertiser”
• “@twitter handle”
Figure 22 shows an example of the results
returned by the keyword search. It contains
the tweet sent by the user.
Figure 22. Tweet fragment recovered from unallocated space
Keyword searches also highlight artefacts
that may be of interest. For instance, a
Google Analytics (GA) URL with access to
account settings (“settings/safety”) inferred
in its payload data was recovered.
6934584320 68 74 74 70 73 3A 2F 2F 77 77 77 2E https://www.
6934584336 67 6F 6F 67 6C 65 2D 61 6E 61 6C 79 74 69 63 73 google-analytics
6934584352 2E 63 6F 6D 2F 63 6F 6C 6C 65 63 74 3F 76 3D 31 .com/collect?v=1
6934584368 26 5F 76 3D 6A 37 32 26 61 69 70 3D 31 26 61 3D &_v=j72&aip=1&a=
6934584384 32 39 34 37 38 31 38 35 33 26 74 3D 70 61 67 65 294781853&t=page
6934584400 76 69 65 77 26 5F 73 3D 32 26 64 6C 3D 68 74 74 view&_s=2&dl=htt
6934584416 70 73 25 33 41 25 32 46 25 32 46 74 77 69 74 74 ps%3A%2F%2Ftwitt
6934584432 65 72 2E 63 6F 6D 25 32 46 73 65 74 74 69 6E 67 er.com%2Fsetting
6934584448 73 25 32 46 73 61 66 65 74 79 26 64 72 3D 68 74 s%2Fsafety&dr=ht
6934584464 74 70 73 25 33 41 25 32 46 25 32 46 74 77 69 74 tps%3A%2F%2Ftwit
6934584480 74 65 72 2E 63 6F 6D 25 32 46 73 65 74 74 69 6E ter.com%2Fsettin
6934584496 67 73 25 32 46 73 61 66 65 74 79 26 64 70 3D 25 gs%2Fsafety&dp=%
6934584512 32 46 75 73 65 72 25 32 46 68 6F 6D 65 25 32 46 2Fuser%2Fhome%2F
6934584528 68 6F 6D 65 26 75 6C 3D 65 6E 2D 67 62 26 64 65 home&ul=en-gb&de
6934584544 3D 55 54 46 2D 38 26 64 74 3D 54 77 69 74 74 65 =UTF-8&dt=Twitte
6934584560 72 26 73 64 3D 32 34 2D 62 69 74 26 73 72 3D 31 r&sd=24-bit&sr=1
6934584576 30 32 34 78 37 36 38 26 76 70 3D 31 30 30 37 78 024x768&vp=1007x
6934584592 36 35 34 26 6A 65 3D 30 26 5F 75 3D 53 41 43 41 654&je=0&_u=SACA
6934584608 41 51 41 42 7E 26 6A 69 64 3D 26 67 6A 69 64 3D AQAB~&jid=&gjid=
6934584624 26 63 69 64 3D 38 33 37 39 39 38 39 36 35 2E 31 &cid=837998965.1
6934584640 35 34 33 36 38 38 35 31 35 26 74 69 64 3D 55 41 543688515&tid=UA
6934584656 2D 33 30 37 37 35 2D 36 26 5F 67 69 64 3D 31 33 -30775-6&_gid=13
6934584672 37 32 33 37 30 37 31 36 2E 31 35 34 33 36 38 38 72370716.1543688
6934584688 35 31 35 26 7A 3D 34 37 33 37 33 33 30 30 35 00 515&z=473733005
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Figure 23 is an example of a GA URL with user login activity in the payload data.
Figure 23. Twitter login activity captured in a Google Analytics URL
Table 9 breaks down the login URL and
describes the parameters.
Other GA URLs results from the key-
word search infer user access to “settings/ac-
count”, “safety/security” etc. on Twitter.
When investigating social network activity,
GA URLs if found on disk, may be useful in
understanding user activity.
Table 9. Google Analytics URL parameter breakdown (source: Google Developers (2018))
Parameter Value Description
t pageview This is the ‘Hit’ type. Permitted values for this parameter are
‘pageview’, ‘screenview’, ‘event’, ‘transaction’, ‘item’, ‘social’,
‘exception’, ‘timing’.
s 1 Hit sequence. The value increments by 1 with each pageview
hit.
dl https://twitter.com/ Document location URL: This parameter sends a resource (or
document) location.
dr https://twitter.com/login Document referrer: the format for the value for this parameter
is a URL (and specifies the referral source of traffic).
dp /user/home/home Document path (i.e. resource path) specifies the ‘path’ portion
of the URL.
ul en-gb User language.
de UTF-8 This specifies the character set used in encoding the page /
resource (Twitter).
dt Twitter Document title. In this instance, “Twitter” is the page title.
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Figure 24 shows the parameters from the GA URL that allude to the cookies set dur-
ing the session.
Figure 24. Cookies.sqlite shows cookie info found in a Google Analytics URL
Recovering and correctly interpreting
artefacts such as the ones discussed in this
section will enable the investigator/analyst
to explain the important aspects of the re-
covered URL features in the context of a
user’s social relationships and activity. For
example, explaining:
i a user’s connection to a social network-
ing site e.g. account set up and creden-
tials
ii a user’s social relationships e.g. if the
user is following or being followed by an-
other user
iii whether Twitter IDs found are as a re-
sult of direct contact, sponsored content
or background processes
5.2 Section Summary
Section 5.1 discussed the experimental re-
sults, and how the proposed two-stage model
can be implemented. This section addresses
the relevance of artefacts recovered and the
attribution of artefacts to a user.
5.2.1 Relevance of Recovered
Artefacts
There are a variety of crimes that can be
committed on social media (Osborne, 2010;
BBC News, 2012; McGuire, 2019a, 2019b)
these include activities such as, but not lim-
ited to cyberstalking, cyberbullying, inap-
propriate contact with another individual
(including minors), fraud (digital currency
or crypto-scams, identity theft), imperson-
ation, social engineering and, dissemination
of malware.
There are also other instances where so-
cial media is used to facilitate physical crime
(BBC, 2010; Bowcott et al., 2011; Press As-
sociation, 2014; McGuire, 2019b). For exam-
ple, burglaries, kidnapping, murder, criminal
damage, drug, human or firearms trafficking.
The artefacts discussed in this paper can
provide an investigator with information and
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context when making a determination about
possible criminal activity. For example, an
investigation into crimes committed on so-
cial media would seek to verify that the sus-
pect had initiated contact with this victim.
Artefacts inferring profile visits as discussed
in Section 5.1.1 can add value to an investi-
gation as it can be used to attribute a visit to
the victim’s profile to the suspect, and cor-
roborating artefacts (Section 5.1.2) can be
used to contextualize the suspect’s activities.
Different artefacts provide insight into the
possible actions of a user that created them.
When taken in isolation, they do not provide
the full picture of events however, corrobo-
rating each artefact in context, will give the
investigator an idea of the sequence of events
and the ability to exclude artefacts that are
not relevant to the case. Social media arte-
facts as discussed in this paper can thus be
used to reconstruct events, show the intent
of the user, and determine user association-
s/relationships during an investigation.
5.2.2 Attributing Artefacts to a User
When considering the attribution of arte-
facts to a user, it is important to establish
that:
i a link exists between a user (suspect)
and a social media account
ii links exist between the user (suspect)
and the activity performed by the social
media account.
To determine the connection between a
user and a social media account, arte-
facts from formhistory (Section 5.1.2.1) may
be used to determine if there are login
credentials for the social media account.
Also, browser history and session informa-
tion artefacts may be used to establish a pat-
tern of logins and the home page for the ac-
count of interest.
Once a determination about account own-
ership has been made, the activity of interest
associated with the social media account can
be linked to the user. This can be achieved
by viewing the activity in context, using the
URL and corroborating artefacts as well as
other types of evidence (alibi, statements)
and then determining whether the user was
at the keyboard at the time of an incident.
Depending on the type of activity being
investigated, it is possible to use the data
obtained through the two-stage model to at-
tribute possible actions to a suspect. An
example would be using images recovered
from the browser cache, in conjunction with
other supporting artefacts such as session in-
formation and browser history to attribute
drug trafficking activity to a social media
account. Using additional artefacts such as
the account login credentials recovered from
formhistory, strings of text advertising drugs
obtained through keyword search etc., a de-
termination can be made linking the suspect
to the account and thus to the activity.
6. CONCLUSION AND
FUTURE WORK
This paper has proposed a two-staged model
for investigating social network activity. It
has shown that a user’s social networking
activity can be inferred based on a range
of artefacts and that it is possible based on
these artefacts recovered, to identify and pri-
oritize evidence that is pertinent to a case.
Although the syntax (see Section 2.3.1) is
constant, some parts of URLs may be sub-
ject to change in structure due to improve-
ments or changes implemented by the service
provider. Such changes may include the im-
plementation of shortened URLs or changing
the location of resources on the website e.g.
moving user photos from /home to /home-
/profile.
This model is currently focused on man-
ual analysis with the help of digital foren-
sics tools. Further work is required to im-
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prove this model by automating each stage
of the evidence recovery process and testing
its generalizability and applicability across
various browsers and operating systems.
An automated framework stemming from
this research is currently under development
and will be used as a proof of concept to
test the recoverability of artefacts and user
relationship attribution.
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